10. Modernising China’s People’s Liberation Army
Key Point Summary
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is well on the path to achieving its goal of a fully modernised military by 2027, funded by substantial budget increases in recent years.
The PLA’s modernisation efforts include developing stealth fighter programmes, space warfare capabilities and the creation of an ‘information warfare’ force.
Under Xi Jinping’s leadership the PLA has been given a new and expanded role. Alongside building capabilities to invade Taiwan, the PLA is tasked with protecting China’s growing
The PLA’s modernisation comes at a time of heightened risk. US forces are going through a period of transition, with new equipment still being acquired or fielded in only limited quantities, while the Ukraine war has depleted Western munition stocks.
Modernising the PLA
One of the most important strategic developments of the past two decades has been the growing capability and reach of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This was underscored in the 2023 “Two Sessions,” where the PLA’s budget enjoyed a 7.2% increase, the largest annual increase since 2019, and notably larger than the projected growth of the overall PRC economy (set at 5%).
From a military that relied on sheer mass, but which was largely equipped with obsolescent equipment, the PLA has evolved into a modern force. Today’s PLA is capable of fielding not only advanced combat systems, but also increasingly sophisticated combat support elements, such as electronic warfare systems. In short, this is not your father’s (or grandfather’s) PLA.
It is often observed that the PLA has not fought a war since the Sino-Vietnam War of 1979. However, it has since been a close student of other people’s wars, carefully assessing and examining American and Russian interventions up to the present day. Similarly overlooked is the fact that no other Asian military has large-scale combat experience, either. Japan, South Korea, Thailand and Taiwan’s militaries have not practised high intensity warfare for an even longer period than the PLA.
From the PLA’s perspective, two key lessons have emerged. The first is that modern warfare relies upon qualitative as well as quantitative factors. A highly trained, well equipped force can defeat a larger, but less sophisticated, adversary. The second is that modern wars are highly oriented around technology, particularly in the realm of information technology.
In light of these conclusions, the PLA’s modernization efforts have included not only new weapons, but changes in doctrine, training, and organisation. We see:
More advanced weapon systems: These include developing two stealth fighter programmes and acquiring more sophisticated support systems, including a variety of airborne early warning aircraft, electronic warfare systems, and space warfare capabilities.
Use of information and communication technologies: The PLA’s modernization efforts have been characterised as making the PLA “fully mechanized, fully informationized, and fully intelligence-ized.” This last element involves integrating not only information and communications technology, but more advanced computing systems, including artificial intelligence and seamless sensor-to-shooter systems.
Building joint operability: Since the 1990s, the PLA has steadily shifted towards an increasingly joint approach to warfare, much like the US and other Western militaries, building better coordination between different PLA units. PLA units have undertaken joint training programmes, while new regulations have emphasised employing the entirety of the PLA’s range of capabilities to maximum effect against an adversary.
New organisational structures: With the constant emphasis on joint operations, and the growing importance of information technologies, the PLA implemented the most comprehensive reorganisation in its history at the end of 2015. These changes created a new Information Warfare Force and the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) to combine China’s electronic warfare, network/cyber warfare, and space warfare forces into a single service.
This massive array of changes reflects the reality that the PLA’s modernization touches every aspect of the institution and has been thorough and comprehensive. The PLA that eventually emerges will be one focussed on fighting and winning future wars.
What does China want to achieve with its military strength?
The PLA is expected to complete its modernization efforts by 2027. At that time, it will be a military that, for the first time since its founding, is both quantitatively and qualitatively on par with any likely adversary.
Crucially, these changes mean that the PLA will no longer be chained to the Chinese mainland. Through modernisation the PLA Navy is expected to operate in the “far seas” as a blue-water fleet. The PLASSF, with its electronic, cyber, and space capabilities, is also clearly designed to have a global reach.
These capabilities are consistent with the “new historic missions'' assigned to the PLA in 2004 under Hu Jintao, which continue in place to this day. These “new historic missions” give the PLA an expansive remit. Not only is the PLA responsible for safeguarding China’s sovereignty and security, but it is also tasked with securing China’s expanding national interests. These include ensuring China’s open access to space, the maritime domain, and the electromagnetic sphere.
The PLA’s traditional goal of preparing to invade Taiwan, if and when requested by the national leadership, remains firmly in place. However, today’s new PLA is also expected to be able to project its power far beyond the Taiwan Strait to wherever in the world China’s interests need protecting.
The lack of transparency also made it much harder for international civil society organisations to follow the progress of negotiations. Although China was able to forge consensus by putting forward a balanced final non-paper in the last days of the summit, observers felt like they were being kept in the dark. The Chinese government is more likely to see a free press as a hindrance, rather than an aid to a successful negotiation.
What risks are posed by China’s growing military strength?
What is of concern is that the US military, in 2027, is likely to be at one of its weakest points, as older systems steadily transition out of the force and new equipment is still being acquired or fielded in only limited quantities. For the United States, it confronts an adversary that, for the first time since the middle of World War II, can challenge its supremacy in the air, at sea, in outer space, and increasingly in the information realm.
Such a situation is likely to raise questions about the credibility of American commitment to its allies in the region, such as Taiwan. To what extent would the United States be willing to counter Chinese aggression, knowing that it might well suffer enormous casualties as it faced a qualitatively equivalent PLA in China’s own front yard?
Historically, the United States has a mixed record. Throughout the Cold War and in recent decades, whenever tested, the US has provided its full military support to guarantee the security of allies in NATO and South Korea and Japan. At the same time, however, it has walked away from protracted wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan, despite major investments of both human and financial cost.
Uncertainty over the US’s response to PLA military aggression in the region may also lead to miscalculations on behalf of China’s neighbouring countries. Ambiguity over America’s commitment to the region could lead potential US allies to hedge their bets and think twice before taking the side of Taiwan or others facing disputes with China. Given the control that the Chinese government has over its own non-market economy, its neighbours face difficult questions about whether they wish to antagonise a powerful and rich Beijing.
Recommendations
For American and Western policy-makers, maintaining a strong defence, and countering the PRC’s efforts at intimidating its neighbours, are essential elements in preventing current tensions from escalating to an actual war.
Replenish the depleted stocks of Western munitions and weapons: Western support for Ukraine has sent a clear signal to aggressor regimes worldwide that their actions will not be meekly accepted. But Western provision of munitions and weapons to Ukraine have often come from the wartime stocks of the supplying countries. The American production line for M-1 tanks closed down decades ago. It is therefore essential that Western countries take steps to refill empty warehouses and arsenals with munitions, spare parts, and weapons to replace those sent to Ukraine. As important to note, the war in Ukraine is a reminder that peacetime calculations of sufficiency for munitions are often far below actual consumption rates in time of war. The replenishment levels need to take the hard-won lessons from Ukraine into account.
Improve and expand international coordination in countering the PRC: Not even the United States can expect to successfully counter the PRC on its own. The tyranny of distance means that US military forces operating in the western Pacific will need local access and bases to sustain operations, whereas the PRC will be operating on its own front doorstep. The PRC will actively try to discourage other states, even longtime US allies, from providing the same access. The American side will need smart diplomacy, adroit use of economic as well as political incentives, and firm negotiating efforts to build the coalition necessary to balance China’s increasingly assertive diplomatic and military stance.